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On 19 May 1919 news of the Amherst general strike spread throughout Nova 
Scotia. "So far as it can be learned", the Sydney Record declared, "it is on 
practically the same lines as the one which has been paralyzing the city of 
Winnipeg for several days past".1 Another editor worried that this eastern 
"replica of Winnipeg labour troubles" might spread to other towns in the 
Maritimes.2 Strike leader Frank Burke did little to alleviate these fears when he 
"championed the One Big Union idea" before a large meeting of local workers 
the next evening and predicted that "the time would be here speedily when the 
Union would have full power from the Atlantic to the Pacific".3 By the time of 
this speech, striking workers in Amherst had already closed the town's eight 
largest industries and local mechanics and civic workers had also joined the 
strike. For the next three weeks the life of the community was dominated by the 
general strike. Throughout Amherst, "the new 'One Big Union' buttons" 
became "conspicuous not only on the streets, but also in many establishments, 
worn by the employees . . . in sympathy with the men".4 Most of the town's 
workers and their families attended daily union meetings to discuss the progress 
of the strike. In speeches and petitions the strikers advanced their demands: 
recognition of the Amherst Federation of Labor — popularly known as the One 
Big Union —, improved wages and working conditions, and a shorter working 
day. At first the employers refused "to deal in any way or form with the One Big 
Union as a whole", but after several weeks of often bitter negotiations they 
granted some, although certainly not all of their employees' demands.5 
Vying for public attention with the more dramatic episodes of class conflict 
that occurred in western Canada in 1919, the Amherst events received scant 
notice outside the Maritimes. Most contemporary commentators viewed the 
Amherst strike either as a sympathy strike to support Winnipeg workers or as a 
spontaneous protest against low wages and poor working conditions. Historians 
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have treated the general strike in much the same manner.6 In part, this disin-
terest stems from the highly specialized regional interests of Canadian 
historians. While there have been a number of studies of western Canadian 
radicalism, the writing of Maritime and central Canadian working-class history 
has lagged behind.7 But recent work suggests that what David Bercuson and 
others have seen as western exceptionalism in the early twentieth-century history 
of Canadian working class radicalism may well have been a more generalized 
phenomenon. The political and organizational form of this activity varied from 
region to region and the tendency to divide the country into radical and con-
servative groups of workers perhaps misses the variety of working class 
responses to post-war industrial capitalism.8 
The Amherst general strike resulted from the interaction of two broad 
historical processes which began prior to the First World War. First, the impact 
of the de-industrialization that accompanied the centralization of power and 
wealth in central Canada affected Amherst's working class in immediate terms 
as working conditions, wages, and living standards fell behind those of other 
Canadian workers. Particularly ominous for local workers were the signs 
pointing toward the complete economic collapse of the town. Second, the local 
labour movement, partly because of previous failures, began to move toward a 
more radical response to these economic developments. In 1919, the merging of 
these two forces forged a new working class solidarity in Amherst, which found 
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expression in the rise of the Amherst Federation of Labor, the renewed interest 
in socialist ideas and, of course, the three week general strike. 
In 1919 Amherst's economy was in crisis. Like the rest of the Maritimes, the 
town was confronting the final effects of its integration into the national 
economy. Throughout the early years of the twentieth century, Amherst thrived 
on a manufacturing economy that produced railway rolling stock, steam engines 
and boilers, woollen goods, boots and shoes, enamel ware, furnaces, pianos, and 
home and office furniture. The largest manufacturer in town, Rhodes-Curry & 
Co., employed 2,000 men to build railway cars and to meet the demands of its 
construction business. Robb Engineering, known nationally for its engines and 
boilers, hired 500 workers, and the shoeworks and woollen mill each had 200 
employees.9 Between 1901 and 1906, Amherst's total value of production soared 
from $1 million to $4.5 million and the population doubled to reach almost 
10,000.10 The town bore the distinction of being one of the region's most 
important and rapidly growing manufacturing centers, and became known 
throughout the Maritimes as "Busy Amherst". Following the 1907-1908 
recession, however, Amherst entered a period of decline that intensified over the 
next 15 years. The flood of central Canadian manufactured goods into the 
region and the extension of metropolitan financial control over the region's 
economy spelled disaster for the town.11 In 1909, in the first and most important 
of a series of industrial mergers in Amherst, the million dollar Rhodes-Curry & 
Co. was linked with two Montreal concerns to form the Canadian Car & 
Foundry Co. The serious 1913-1914 depression signalled yet a further weaving 
of local manufacturing into the national economy. Industries severely reduced 
staff and at least one factory in Amherst closed permanently. Although this 
pattern was repeated across the country, few towns faced the total ruin of their 
manufacturing sector that was confronting Amherst. 
The demands of the First World War brought an artificial buoyancy to 
Amherst's economy. Unemployment declined as men enlisted in the army and 
factories shifted to wartime production. The railway carworks concentrated on 
munitions, Robb Engineering built marine boilers and manufactured shells, the 
9 Employment statistics are compiled from a variety of newspaper and government sources. See, 
for example, Nova Scotia, Journals of the Assembly, 1911, Appendix no. 15. Historical accounts 
of Amherst's two largest industries are available in The Busy East (March 1911) and Norman 
Ritchie, The Story of Robb's (Amherst, N.S., n.d.). 
10 Canada, Census, 1911, vol. I l l , Table XI, "Manufactories of Cities having 5,000 inhabitants 
and over compared for 1891, 1901, 1911 by provinces". 
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Canada: Brym and Sacouman, Underdevelopment and Social Movements in Atlantic Canada; 
T.W. Acheson, "The National Policy and the Industrialization of the Maritimes", Acadiensis, I 
(1971), pp. 3-28; David Alexander, "Economic Growth in the Atlantic Region, 1880-1940", 
Acadiensis, VIII (1978), pp. 47-76; David Frank, "The Cape Breton Coal Industry and the Rise 
and Fall of the British Empire Steel Corporation", Acadiensis, VII (1977), pp. 3-34. 
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piano factory provided shell boxes, and the woollen mill and shoeworks thrived 
on government contracts. The armistice of November 1918 brought an abrupt 
halt to this activity. Manufacturers warned of a prolonged "readjustment 
period" and prepared to lay off staff, as unemployment again became a serious 
problem with the return to Amherst of 500 war veterans. While many local 
residents worried about the ability, and in some cases, the desire of local 
business to make the transition to peace-time production, the most heated 
debates were reserved for speculation over the future of the crucially important 
carworks.12 Before the war Canadian Car & Foundry had suspended 
operations at the Amherst Malleable Iron Co. and, in 1919, it announced the 
closing of plants in Halifax and New Glasgow. These actions were integral 
aspects of Canadian Car & Foundry's policy to concentrate production in 
central Canada. Supervised by Nathaniel Curry, former president of Rhodes-
Curry, this policy threatened the existence of the Amherst carworks. As one 
observer remarked, "the days of the wooden cars" built in the Amherst works 
were passing as surely as the days of "wooden ships and iron men" had slipped 
into a bygone era. If Amherst was to remain an important center of the rolling 
stock industry, it needed modernization, especially equipment to construct 
pressed steel rolling stock. But while Canadian Car & Foundry modernized its 
Montreal facilities and constructed a new plant in Ft. William, it retreated from 
car building in Amherst.13 
In 1919, the declining importance of the Amherst shops within Canadian 
Car & Foundry's corporate structure created three pressing problems for local 
workers: irregular employment, poor working conditions, and wage differentials 
favouring the company's Montreal employees. Finding steady employment was 
a serious concern for Amherst carbuilders. During the winter of 1918, the 
company operated with fewer than 200 men. Although this number increased to 
800 in the spring months, this was still far below the 2,000 workers employed in 
1905. Given the erratic employment practices of the company, even the men 
hired in 1919 had few prospects for steady work. Canadian Car & Foundry 
often raised the hopes of Amherst workers with announcements of massive 
hirings, followed several months later by equally impressive layoffs. Persistent 
rumours of one department or another being removed to Montreal further 
heightened the workers' anxieties.14 Working conditions in the carworks also 
created tension. In 1919 moulder William Rackham complained to the Royal 
Commission on Industrial Relations of high gas levels in the foundry and 
claimed that the factory inspector refused to heed his complaints. The commis-
sioners were urged to tour the plant and discover for themselves that conditions 
12 Amherst Daily News, 4 January 1919; Town of Amherst, Urban Renewal Study, prepared by 
Norman Pearson and Canadian-British Engineering Consultants (Amherst, 1965), p. 12. 
13 Daily News, 20, 21 June 1919; Monetary Times, Annual Review for 1913, p. 79. 
14 Daily News, 21 June, 6 May, 17 June 1919. 
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"were far from being what the law demanded".15 Although such conditions were 
common, Canadian Car & Foundry's decision not to direct new investment 
into its Amherst facilities undoubtedly aggravated the problem. The most 
contentious issue in 1919 was Canadian Car & Foundry's decision not to 
extend to Amherst the agreement it reached with its Montreal employees. The 
Montreal contract recognized the International Brotherhood of Railway 
Carmen, and adopted the "Whitley Advisory Council idea", the nine hour day 
with 10 hours pay, five day week, overtime pay, and layoffs by seniority. 
Considered a "fair and reasonable settlement" by the Amherst press and most 
local workers, all agreed that the contract should be extended to the eastern 
carmen, but the company refused to grant any concessions to its Amherst 
employees, except the nine hour day with no provision for 10 hours pay.16 
The marginality of the Amherst shops to the financial health of the Canadian 
Car & Foundry strengthened significantly the company's negotiating position. 
Concentration of railway car production in Montreal made it easier, and 
probably necessary, given the relative decline in productivity in Amherst, to 
resist the contract demands of eastern workers. Management believed that the 
long layoffs of the previous year and the threatened closure of the carworks, 
which finally occurred in the 1920s, would make the carmen reluctant to strike. 
Canadian Car & Foundry's successful attempts to curtail union organizing in 
the years preceding the war, especially the 1914 defeat of the International 
Association of Machinists, further bolstered its determination to bargain hard in 
1919.17 But the carmen were equally determined to win a contract consistent 
with that of Montreal workers and partly because of their previous failures at 
union organizing, they began to move toward a broad based industrial unionism. 
The same pressures that prodded the railway carmen toward a new form of 
union organization als.o affected other Amherst working-class families. In 1919 
none of the town's eight major industries appeared to have a particularly stable 
future. Managerial attitudes toward the employees of the Toronto controlled 
Dominion Manufacturing Co. and the Truro, Nova Scotia dominated 
Stanfield's Co. varied little from those of Canadian Car & Foundry. Both 
Dominion Manufacturing's 1914 purchase of Amherst's Christie Woodworking 
Co. and Stanfield's takeover of the Amherst Woollen Mill during the war were 
mergers to improve profits through reduced competition and were followed by a 
rationalization of productive capacity that detrimentally effected Amherst and 
15 Daily News, 10 June 1919; Eastern Federationist, 14 June 1919. 
16 Daily News, 13 May 1919. For information on the Whitley Council concept in Canada, see 
Bruce Scott, " 'A Place in the Sun': the Industrial Council at Massey-Harris, 1919-1926", 
Labour/Le Travailleur, I (1976), pp. 158-92. 
17 "Strikes and Lockouts File", Strike #1914 (15), RG 27, vol. 303, Public Archives of Canada 
[hereafter PAC]. 
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brought the eventual closing of the facilities.18 Next to Canadian Car & 
Foundry, Stanfield's was the most aggressive company in the pursuit of this 
policy. Stanfield's resisted any attempts to improve working conditions which 
were easily the most deplorable in Amherst and wages among the lowest in 
town. The employees' response was predictable, and between 1918-1920 they 
fought three bitter strikes and they were the last employees to return to work 
during the general strike.19 In 1919 a number of important Amherst industries, 
including Amherst Boot & Shoe, Amherst Foundry, and Robb Engineering 
remained ostensibly locally owned and managed. These companies continued to 
struggle against the forces that had pushed other local industries into mergers, 
although Robb Engineering was already heavily financed by Montreal interests 
and the Amherst Foundry had proposed, but failed to complete, a union with a 
Port Hope, Ontario company. After the war, competition with central 
Canada's large scale "specialized factories" and a freight rate structure that 
was beginning to push local manufacturers even from traditional regional 
markets worried Amherst businessmen and during the general strike, local 
owners resisted the demands of their workers with the same determination as 
Amherst's absentee employers.20 
In one way or another, the impact of regional underdevelopment touched the 
members of all classes in Amherst. For some individuals of the business class, 
like Nathaniel Curry, it brought participation in a financially attractive 
industrial merger and the continuation of a lucrative business career in 
Montreal.21 Other manufacturers, like David Robb, who lacked Curry's 
shrewdness in the ways of high finance and probably retained some commitment 
to the region, faced the collapse of their industries before fierce central 
Canadian competition. Underdevelopment also posed a threat to the livelihood 
of many small businessmen, since factory closings and a declining population 
represented lost business to local merchants. Finally, the working-class families 
attracted to Amherst during the 1898-1908 boom faced a most uncertain future, 
since local industries offered little long term security and few immediate 
benefits.22 
18 Dunn and Bradstreet, Gazetteer for the Maritime Provinces (July 1915), p. 370; A. Robson 
Lamy, "The Development and Decline of Amherst as an Industrial Centre" (Honours thesis, 
Mount Allison University, 1930). 
19 Daily News, 22 May, 10 June 1919. 
20 For an analysis of the problems facing Maritime capitalists in 1919, see Forbes, Maritime 
Rights Movement, esp. pp. 54-72. 
21 Monetary Times Annual Review for 1913, p. 79: Who's Who in Canada, 1919-1920 (Montreal, 
1920). 
22 Daily News, 21 June 1919. 
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Amherst's deepening economic crisis prompted a remarkable upsurge of local 
working-class activity in the immediate post-war years. In November 1918, 
while the Amherst Board of Trade sponsored armistice celebrations, labour 
spokesmen made their first public appeals to "workers of every grade" to join in 
the building of a new labour council. They argued that collective working-class 
action won industrial disputes and predicted "that so long as the employers can 
keep you [workers] in your unorganized condition, just so long will you be at 
their mercy".23 This call for organization struck a responsive chord among 
Amherst's working-class population. In late November they formed the 
Amherst Federation of Labor, which by the end of the year had 700 members, 
making it the largest labour organization in the town's history. By April 1919, 
its ranks had doubled and, in the early days of the general strike, its membership 
must have numbered over 3,000.24 Although it drew its leadership from among 
the town's skilled workingmen, the Amherst Federation of Labor's organiza-
tion diverged significantly from that of the short-lived 1904 and 1913 labour 
councils chartered by the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada. The Amherst 
Federation of Labor rejected the exclusivism which had characterized the craft 
orientated pre-war movement and emphasized the organization of unskilled 
workers, the majority of whom had little trade union experience prior to 1919. 
The commitment to the unskilled went beyond union membership to include a 
genuine effort to reduce the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers. In 
essence, the Amherst Federation of Labor was an independent industrial union 
that grouped the employees of Amherst's eight largest manufacturing concerns 
into one organization. The union also included building trades and civic 
workers, tailors, garage mechanics, the unemployed, especially the veterans, and 
even a restaurant owner, boarding house proprietor, and a local doctor. As 
former member Lester Doncaster recalls, it "was supposed to be One Great 
Union, just one Great Union of all the factories in Amherst".25 
The initial structure of the Amherst Federation of Labor was relatively 
simple. Workers paid a "one dollar fee", which brought them the right to 
participate in the election of officers and all other affairs that came before the 
union.26 Membership gave the workers, at least theoretically, an equal hand in 
setting contract demands, initiating strike action, and the ratification of all 
agreements reached with individual manufacturers. During a general strike the 
approval of all union members was required before any one group of employees 
could return to work. Yet, while the Amherst Federation of Labor functioned as 
a single body, special units were established in several of the factories. Dane 
Lodge, the first and largest of these units, was organized early and may, in fact, 
23 Ibid., 20 December 1918. 
24 Ibid., 3 January 1919. 
25 Interview of Lester Doncaster by the author, Amherst, 1977. 
26 Daily News, 20 December 1918. 
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have been organized simultaneously with the larger body. This lodge served as a 
workplace unit, giving special attention to the problems of union members 
employed in the carworks.27 In May 1919 the Textile Workers' Union, a 
committee similar in purpose to Dane Lodge, was organized among the predom-
inately female work force in the Amherst Woollen Mills.28 It is not surprising 
that these units emerged first among the textile and carworkers since conditions 
in these shops made them the most militant in Amherst. In late summer 1918, 
before the formation of the Amherst Federation of Labor, both factories had 
experienced strikes of several days duration.29 The presence of such organiza-
tions also accounts, in part, for the cohesiveness of these employees throughout 
the general strike. In June 1919 they were the last workers to reach settlements 
with their respective employers. Neither lodge, of course, had any independent 
status and they were bound by the decisions of the larger organization. 
Although the Amherst Federation of Labor was the largest trade union 
organization in the town there were several locals of national and international 
unions. The railway freight handlers belonged to the Canadian Brotherhood of 
Railway Employees and some tradesmen supported the International Associa-
tion of Machinists, Iron Molders' Union of America, and the International 
Brotherhood of Boilermakers' and Helpers' Union. The relationship between 
these unions and the Amherst Federation of Labor remains ambiguous. In the 
carworks, for example, most metal workers joined the Amherst Federation of 
Labor, probably while maintaining membership in their respective inter-
nationals. Throughout the general strike these skilled workers participated in 
the deliberations of Dane Lodge and other Amherst Federation of Labor 
activities.30 A different situation existed in the Amherst Foundry where the 
moulders continued to support a strong I.M.U. presence. First organized in the 
1890s, these moulders enjoyed the longest and most successful history of any 
Amherst union and, as recently as April 1919, had emerged victorious in a 
struggle over wage schedules. But although the Amherst Foundry moulders did 
not join the Amherst Federation of Labor, they struck in sympathy with the 
union.31 
On the other hand the metal-workers at Robb Engineering showed less 
support for the Amherst Federation of Labor. Robb's employed the largest 
concentration of metal-workers in Amherst, approximately 350 workers, 
perhaps one-half of whom were machinists and the remainder largely moulders 
and boilermakers. During the months leading up to the May confrontation, 
27 Ibid., 31 March 1919. 
28 Eastern Federationist, 17, 24 May, 1919. 
29 Daily News, 31 August, 9, 11 September 1918. 
30 Interview of Lester Doncaster by the author, Amherst, 1977. 
31 Amherst Daily News, 1 May 1919; "Strikes and Lockouts File", Strike #19(92), RG 27, vol. 311, 
PAC; Eastern Federationist, 14 June 1919. 
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these workers gave what appeared to be lukewarm support to the Amherst 
Federation of Labor. Though they participated in the initial stoppage on 19 
May, the men broke ranks with other workers and returned to work the follow-
ing day. The reluctance of the Robb employees to follow the lead of the Amherst 
Foundry moulders and maintain a sympathy strike was influenced by several 
factors. First, and most significantly, the company's history of paternalistic 
management fostered at the very least the grudging loyalty of the work force 
into the 1920s. In fact, until 1919, Robb Engineering could boast that the 
company had never experienced a strike since its organization in 1891. This was 
a remarkable achievement since elsewhere metal-workers struggled against 
technological change and managerial reorganization of the work process. As 
early as 1909, the metal trades journal, Canadian Machinery, carried reports on 
Robb's experimentation with piece-work and the premium system, two 
important components of a managerial programme condemned by labour as 
"making of men what men are supposed to make of metals: machines".32 
Robb's dependency on shell contracts during the war also should have created 
workplace tensions, since munitions work often brought new initiatives by the 
employers in the areas of mechanization and the introduction of semi-skilled 
workers into positions controlled previously by tradesmen. This process of skill 
dilution generated numerous confrontations between management and labour in 
Canadian, British, and American metal shops. But at Robb Engineering these 
tensions never gave rise to a strike.33 
David Robb embodied the paternalism that guided the company's industrial 
relations policies. Son of the industry's founder, active in local political and 
social affairs, and manager of Robb's for almost 20 years, David Robb was 
Amherst's most respected businessman. While guiding the company, Robb was 
reputed by some of his former employees to have "paid a fair day's wage", 
sponsored a sick benefit association, and maintained an apprenticeship program 
that "gave local boys a chance to get a skill and stay at home".34 The company's 
economic problems were also important in keeping the men at work. Pushed 
from its traditional steam engine markets by large central Canadian suppliers 
of electric motors, Robb Engineering faced financial ruin in the pre-war years. 
After 1914, generous munitions contracts from the Borden government "gave 
'Robbs' a new lease on life", but the company's problems returned with the 
32 Labour News (Hamilton), 1 March 1912, as cited in Craig Heron, "The Crisis of the Artisan: 
Hamilton's Metal Workers in the Early Twentieth Century" (paper presented to the Annual 
Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association, Saskatoon, 1979). 
33 See Craig Heron, "The Crisis of the Artisan"; Craig Heron and Bryan Palmer, "Through the 
Prism of the Strike: Industrial Conflict in Southern Ontario, 1901-1914", Canadian Historical 
Review, LVIII (1977), pp. 423-58; James Hinton, The First Shop Stewards' Movement 
(London, 1973); David Montgomery, Workers' Control in America (New York, 1979). 
34 Interview of Robert McKay by the author, Amherst, 1976. 
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war's end and David Robb embarked on a new "staple line of production to fill 
the gap that must naturally follow the cancellation of shell orders". The 
Robb-Baker tractor was expected to be the industry's new source of riches and 
in 1919 it was ready for production.35 The message for the employees was 
simple; only an immediate shift to tractor building could avert bankruptcy. This 
situation was well known to the workers because, as Robb told the Royal 
Commission on Industrial Relations, he "showed his men his accounts, and 
demonstrated to them . . . the urgency of the contracts upon which it [the 
company] was working".36 
The relatively harmonious state of industrial relations at Robb Engineering 
contrasted sharply with conditions at the Canadian Car & Foundry shops. To 
many Amherst residents, Robb's situation demanded the co-operation of 
management and labour to avoid the collapse of the company, which everyone 
feared. In the carworks the crisis seemed to be the creation of corporate policy 
makers, not uncontrollable economic forces, as the relatively financially secure 
Canadian Car & Foundry was preparing for a possible flight from Amherst in 
search of profits elsewhere. Such a program did little to instill any sense of 
loyalty among the company's Amherst employees and the carworks' history was 
dotted with bitter confrontations between management and labour, especially 
after the 1909 merger, when the general improvement in economic conditions 
gave rise to an upsurge in labour organizing. In the autumn of 1910 the car-
workers formed Fair Play Lodge International Brotherhood of Railway 
Carmen of America (I.B.R.C.). While over 500 workers were brought into this 
industrial union, company hostility and internal strife brought its demise in 
early 1911.37 After the I.B.R.C.'s collapse conditions in the carworks steadily 
worsened, as Canadian Car & Foundry used the recession of 1913 to introduce 
significant wage reductions for the workers. The rolling mill and sheetmetal 
workers struck on separate occasions but were successful only in limiting and 
not reversing wage reductions of almost 30 percent.38 Buoyed by these victories, 
the carworks' management prepared- for a major confrontation with its 
machinists, the company's only unionized workers, and in 1914 announced a 5 
to 15 percent wage reduction for one-half of the company's 33 machinists. 
Rather than accept these changes, the members of the International Association 
of Machinists (I.A.M.) struck in a dispute that lasted for more than a year and 
that was never formally settled because the company continued production with 
non-union workers, forcing the I.A.M. to call off the strike.39 
35 Daily News, 13 July, 29 August 1917, 9 October 1918, 4 January 1919. 
36 Ibid., 10 June 1919. 
37 Eastern Labor News (Moncton), 18 February 1911. 
38 "Strikes and Lockouts File", Strike #1914 (15) and 1914 (2), RG 27, vol. 303, PAC. 
39 Ibid., Strike #14 (23); Eastern Labor News, 9 August 1911. 
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The growth of conflict in the carworks during the pre-war years represented 
more than "simply conflicts over the size of the pay packet".40 After the turn of 
the century, it was the railway and metal-working industries in North America 
that sought to maximize profits through the assertion of greater control over the 
labour process. Management perceived the deeply held artisanal culture of their 
craftsmen and skilled workers as the major obstacle to the success of these plans 
and, in response to the artisans' resistance to the erosion of workplace 
autonomy, tried to introduce efficiency schemes and mechanization programs to 
weaken the power of craft unions. The railway companies spearheaded this drive 
in North America and some of these changes were introduced into Amherst's 
railway carbuilding shops at least as early as 1913. It is significant that the 
earliest strikes occurred in the metal-working divisions, which bore the brunt of 
management's new assertiveness. Sheetmetal workers struck in August 1918 to 
protest working conditions and the firing of a moulder in early May 1919, for 
protesting the assignment of his helper to another job, almost sparked a general 
strike.41 It was not only the metal-working trades in the carworks that felt these 
pressures. Writing to the Industrial Banner in 1914, painter Irvin McGinn 
asserted that attempts by Amherst employers to "mix-in . . . tradesmen and 
labourers of all classes" had turned many craftsmen "to the great and noble 
cause of unionism".42 Unfortunately for these workers, their rate of 
organizational success was no better than that of the metal-workers. 
The almost continuous conflict in the carshops, and the workers' inability to 
maintain an effective craft union presence were important factors behind the 
growth of industrial unionism. Clashes with management prior to 1914 had 
demonstrated the ineffectiveness of craft unions in a factory employing as many 
as 25 different types of tradesmen and hundreds of semi-skilled workers and 
labourers. Appearing before the Mather Commission in June 1919, Frank 
Burke told the commissioners that the "all-grades principle" of the Amherst 
Federation of Labor was adopted precisely because "craft unions were too easily 
dismissed by the employers".43 Another prominent labour activist in Amherst, 
C M . Arsenault of Pictou County, agreed that "craft unionism clings to the old 
ideas which are not keeping abreast of economic lines and advanced ideas".44 
Tradesmen in the carworks responded enthusiastically to calls for a broad-based 
industrial organization. Eleven of the 13 men holding executive rank in the 
Amherst Federation of Labor between November 1918 and July 1919 worked 
for Canadian Car & Foundry; five of them were carpenters and four others 
40 K.C.T.C. Knowles, Strikes — A Study in Industrial Conflict (Oxford, 1952), p. 219. 
41 Daily News, 31 August 1918, 2, 3,.5 May 1919. 
42 Industrial Banner (London), 1 May 1914. 
43 Daily News, 10 June 1919. 
44 Ibid., 2 June 1919. 
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metal-workers. The president of the Amherst Federation of Labor, Frank 
Burke, a carpenter in the carworks; the vice-president, William Mclnnis, a 
moulder; and the recording secretary, Alfred Barton, another carpenter, had 
held executive positions in Fair Play Lodge, International Brotherhood of 
Railway Carmen prior to the war. This continuity of leadership in the Amherst 
labour movement was a crucial influence on the emergence of the Amherst 
Federation of Labor and it was not limited to the carworks. Others among the 
leadership cadre, like tailors Dan McDonald and John McLeod, had even longer 
records of involvement in local labour activities.45 
The conditions that pressured workers towards new organizational forms 
were reinforced by a renewed interest in socialist ideas. Before the First World 
War, Amherst socialists maintained locals of the Socialist and Social 
Democratic parties, offered socialist candidates in civic elections, and joined 
other trade unionists in sponsoring a labour candidate in a 1909 provincial 
by-election.46 The fracturing of the international socialist movement during the 
war discouraged many Amherst socialists, but by 1919 they had started once 
again to distribute radical literature, conduct street corner debates, and sponsor 
public forums. In February, a group of S.P.C. supporters invited Roscoe 
Fillmore, a prominent local socialist, to speak on "The Truth About Russia". In 
two lectures Fillmore accused the "capitalist press" of misrepresenting the 
revolution "because it was a purely working class movement" that meant 
"capitalist downfall everywhere if it succeeded in Russia".47 This Amherst 
audience knew "little or nothing of the Russian situation", Fillmore observed, 
"and they drank it in like milk". Convinced that this "Amherst bunch contains 
the best blood of any part of the Maritime movement", Fillmore committed 
himself to organizing a new S.P.C. local among the "about 40 young energetic 
Reds" already in Amherst. This socialist presence was strongest in the 
carworks, where Fillmore found little difficulty in selling "a roll of Red Flags 
and Soviets".4' 
In April 1919, the sudden explosion of daylight saving time into a class 
question and the Amherst Federation of Labor's attempts to affiliate with the 
One Big Union reflected the increasingly militant mood of the working-class. 
Daylight saving first came to Canada in 1918 as a federal war measure. When 
45 These biographies are compiled from town directories, the daily press, and various labour 
newspapers. 
46 David Frank and Nolan Reilly, "The Emergence of the Socialist Movement in the Maritimes, 
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the question of continuing the practice was left to the municipalities the next 
year, Amherst's town council convened a public meeting in April to discuss the 
issue. While merchants and manufacturers championed the idea, many workers, 
increasingly suspicious of any initiatives from the business people, opposed it. 
To demonstrate their opposition, 300 Amherst Federation of Labor members 
marched to the public meeting and "hooted down" daylight saving proponents. 
Roscoe Fillmore charged angrily that daylight saving was a capitalist plot to 
lengthen the working day. Other workers complained bitterly that because 
business people did not have to rise early in the morning, they were "not in a 
very good position to understand what the earlier time actually meant in the 
average workingman's home". As a result of this confrontation, and despite the 
best efforts of daylight saving proponents to revive the question, the issue, the 
Daily News reported, was squashed "flatter than the proverbial pancake".49 
It was during this debate that the leaders of the Amherst Federation of Labor 
established contact with the western One Big Union movement. In a telegram to 
Victor Midgley, secretary of the O.B.U. Central Executive Committee, the 
Amherst workers inquired "as to what steps we should take to unite with the 
One Big Union".50 Midgley replied two weeks later that the Maritimes had 
jumped the gun. The Central Executive Committee was only authorized to 
conduct a referendum among western trade unionists to determine if they wished 
to leave the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada (T.L.C.) and form the 
O.B.U. Until then, the O.B.U. technically did not exist and had no "authority to 
issue or accept affiliations", although Midgley promised to keep his Amherst 
supporters in good supply with O.B.U. "leaflets and other propaganda".51 In the 
western referendum held in May, approximately three quarters of the votes cast 
favoured replacing the T.L.C. with the O.B.U., whose supporters convened the 
new organization's founding convention on 4 June in Calgary. Several weeks 
later, the Amherst Federation of Labor voted 1185 to 1 to join the O.B.U.52 This 
decision in favour of the O.B.U. marked the final rejection of affiliation with the 
T.L.C, which had been offered to the Amherst Federation of Labor in March 
1919.53 
The presence in Amherst of S.P.C. sympathizers may have provided the 
Maritimers with a link to the O.B.U. In the pre-war years Amherst socialists 
sustained an active S.P.C. branch that included such prominent Amherst 
49 Daily News, 16, 17, 21 April 1919. 
50 Alfred Barton to C. Stevenson, 10 April 1919, One Big Union Collection [henceforth O.B.U. 
Collection], PAM. Correspondence between the Amherst Federation of Labor and the O.B.U. 
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Federation of Labor organizers as moulders William Mclnnis and Arthur 
McArthur, and Clarence Joise, a carpenter. Although it is not clear whether 
these men remained S.P.C. members, the S.P.C. did experience a revival in 
Amherst after the war and its activities gave the town direct contact with events 
in western Canada, where a number of S.P.C. activists such as Victor Midgley, 
R.B. Russell, and W.A. Pritchard, were involved in organizing the O.B.U.54 The 
overlap in S.P.C. and O.B.U. personnel in the west was apparent to Amherst 
socialists and undoubtedly influenced them in the direction of the O.B.U. Yet, 
although this relationship may explain the Amherst socialists' interest in the 
O.B.U., it does not explain why the majority of Amherst union members 
followed suit. In fact, the decision of these Maritime workers to throw their lot 
in with a labour organization centered in western Canada is not as surprising as 
it may appear. First, similar to much of the west, Amherst lacked a strong craft 
union tradition. Except for the I.M.U., craft unions had been unable to protect 
skilled workers against the employers' assaults on their working conditions. 
Thus, in Amherst, the weakness of craft unions among skilled workers 
encouraged them to explore different forms of working class organization. 
Another factor in the Amherst Federation of Labor's decision to affiliate with 
the westerners was the initial ideological eclecticism of the O.B.U. Because no 
single political position dominated the O.B.U.'s early activities, various socialist 
and syndicalist tendencies found a home in the union. Although this would 
change over the next few years, in the spring of 1919 the union's flexibility on 
political and industrial strategies opened the O.B.U. to many workers who 
otherwise might have rejected it. This was important in Amherst where the 
Amherst Federation of Labor's leadership was not influenced by the syndicalist 
tendencies popular in the west. In March 1919, Frank Burke headed the 
Amherst delegation attending a Halifax meeting of provincial labour leaders, 
which established a provincial federation of labour and discussed forming an 
independent labour party to contest the next provincial election.55 C M . 
Arsenault, Pictou County labour spokesman and editor of the Eastern Feder-
ationist, also advocated independent labour politics. In 1919, Arsenault spent 
many days in Amherst assisting in the Amherst Federation of Labor's organiza-
tion and campaigning for the building of a labour party.56 The industrial rather 
than craft emphasis in the O.B.U. also attracted local support to the union 
because the Amherst Federation of Labor was already an industrial union 
organized along the principles of One Big Unionism. 
In the spring of 1919, local workers exhibited in their actions a solidarity that 
was unique in Amherst's history. Relatively minor issues exploded into hotly 
54 David J. Bercuson explores the relationship between the S.P.C. and the founding of the O.B.U. 
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contested disputes. When a man was accused of stealing tools from his employer 
he was acquitted even though the judge in his charge to the jury "had no hesita-
tion in saying that the accused was 'not a desirable citizen in the community' " ." 
This episode and events like the daylight saving time dispute worried the editor 
of the Daily News because "though class consciousness has never been one of 
the particular manifestations of the workingman [sic] of this community, there 
is no question that it is showing a greater strength among them today than it 
ever did before".58 On 1 May, events at the Canadian Car & Foundry almost 
precipitated a general strike when moulder Fred Reid was fired for protesting 
the assignment of his helper to another job. At a hastily convened meeting of the 
Amherst Federation of Labor, some members demanded a general strike to 
force the company to reinstate Reid. Although a majority of the workers at the 
meeting sympathized with Reid's plight, they decided to delay strike action since 
many of them had just returned to work after long layoffs. Another considera-
tion of the membership was that Frank Burke and William Mclnnis were 
scheduled to leave shortly for Montreal to open negotiations with Canadian 
Car & Foundry officials and many Amherst Federation of Labor workers felt 
that strike action should be delayed until the results of these general bargaining 
sessions were known.59 
The two Amherst Federation of Labor leaders travelled to Montreal on 15 
May and, after several days of fruitless negotiations, climbed aboard an east 
bound train for Amherst, where a delegation of workers met them at the station 
to protest recent measures adopted by the carworks' management. While Burke 
and Mclnnis negotiated in Montreal, the company directors had instructed their 
Amherst manager to introduce the nine hour day without a provision for ten 
hours pay. The company's unilateral action particularly infuriated the Amherst 
Federation of Labor officials because they perceived it as an attempt to circum-
vent the union.60 On Monday, 19 May, the carworkers milled around the gates to 
the Canadian Car & Foundry shops. The employees refused to begin the day's 
shift and "formed in parade marching through the principle [sic] streets" of 
Amherst to their meeting hall.61 As the meeting commenced, many workers 
vented their frustrations with management but it was Burke who focussed their 
anger onto two issues: union recognition and wage differentials between eastern 
and central Canadian workers. Burke argued that the company precipitated the 
crisis by refusing to recognize that the Amherst Federation of Labor had "a 
57 Ibid., 11, 12 October 1918. 
58 Ibid., 21 May 1919. 
59 Ibid., 2, 5 May 1919. 
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right to be consulted on any changes of hours, or rules of wages, affecting the 
men".52 Burke also demanded that the company extend to Amherst its agree-
ment with Montreal employees for fewer hours with no decrease in take-home 
pay. After listening to Burke and several other Amherst Federation of Labor 
officials, the carworkers dispersed with a call for an emergency meeting of the 
union that evening. 
News of the trouble at the carworks spread quickly throughout Amherst and 
the evening meeting was crowded with workers who "decided that employees of 
all industries in the town, including town employees cease work on Tuesday 
morning".63 Although the strike was called to support Dane Lodge members, 
the employees of each industry were directed to meet separately to prepare 
additional demands to be presented to the town's employers along with the basic 
proposals for recognition of the Amherst Federation of Labor and the eight 
hour day. On Tuesday morning, every factory remained closed, building trades 
workers struck, and the town's outside workers left their jobs. In the evening, 
the Amherst Federation of Labor staged the largest working class rally in 
Amherst's history. "Between two to three thousand workers met at the Labour 
Hall", reported the Eastern Federationist, "formed in a line and paraded to the 
square".64 After speeches by local and visiting labour spokesmen, Frank Burke 
recounted some of the background to the dispute and proclaimed the union's 
determination to stand firm until its demands were accepted by the manu-
facturers.65 
The Amherst Federation of Labor's swift action caught many employers by 
surprise. After recovering from their initial "shock", they gathered at the 
Marshlands Club to evolve a common strategy and agreed unanimously to 
"absolutely" refuse "one and all to deal in any way or form with the 'One Big 
Union' as a whole". Throughout the first two weeks of the strike, this position 
remained firm except for one minor and very brief incident. Late in the first 
week of the strike, the owners of the Victor Woodworking Co. expressed their 
willingness to give a wage increase to their 75 employees and recognize the 
Amherst Federation of Labor. Pressure from other manufacturers, however, 
forced Victor's to reverse its stand. The small, locally owned business explained 
this change of policy as a decision not "to be the first squealor [sic]" among the 
employers and promised it would take direction from "the big fellows", 
Amherst's largest employers. In order to improve its tarnished image among 
other manufacturers, Victor's claimed to have installed a "new system" that 
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Although the employers agreed that union recognition was unacceptable, each 
industry used different tactics to get its employees back to work. Frank 
Stanfield, a principal owner in the Amherst Woollen Mill and director of the 
family's Truro textile mills, championed the intimidation technique. He refused 
to discuss the employees' demands, laid off his salaried staff, and announced 
that the Amherst plant was "closed down". Canadian Car & Foundry officials 
chose to ignore the strike, while the shoeworks and foundry managements agreed 
to meet with their workers, but not Amherst Federation of Labor negotiators. 
At Robb Engineering, David Robb appealed to his employees to return to work 
and promised to meet many of their grievances. Across the street from Robb's, 
the Amherst Piano Co. tried to entice its employees to return to work with a 
profit sharing proposal. Manager J.A. McDonald proposed that once the 
company achieved a seven percent net profit on capitalization all additional 
profits would be divided among the shareholders and employees. The workers 
rejected the scheme because, as Frank Burke pointed out, the company had 
never turned a seven percent profit in its six year history.67 
The first crack in the solidarity the Amherst labour movement had enjoyed 
over the previous months occurred when the employees at Robb Engineering 
returned to work on the second day of the strike. But, despite the company's 
serious financial situation and David Robb's stature as a community leader, the 
strike ended only when Robb agreed to negotiate a new wage schedule and a 
shorter working day. The next week, when these negotiations bogged down, the 
workers threatened to strike until their demands were met. This announcement 
jolted David Robb into an agreement with "a committee representing 
employees", granting higher wages, a nine hour day, and the "Whitley Council 
principle".68 In the final analysis, it was Robb Engineering's dire economic 
straits that kept its employees working throughout most of the general strike. 
Other factories with a history of relatively harmonious industrial relations and 
owners with a community stature that equalled that of David Robb could not 
persuade their employees to abandon the general strike. To attribute the actions 
of the predominantly skilled work force at Robb's simply to some tradition of 
craft exclusivism also seems to miss the point. The Amherst Federation of 
Labor won solid support from the town's other skilled workers and there is no 
reason to assume that Robb employees were unusually craft conscious. After 
their return to work the Robb employees did not abandon the Amherst Federa-
tion of Labor, as the machinists, moulders, and boilermakers made important 
contributions to the union's strike fund.69 
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Several events cushioned the effect of the Robb employees' return to work on 
the morale of the Amherst Federation of Labor. Most important was the town 
council's decision to give "full recognition" to the union and to implement the 
eight hour day with ten hours pay.70 The town council's concession to the civic 
workers was its attempt to find an impasse to the continuing confrontation 
between the Amherst Federation of Labor and the employers. A majority of the 
councillors were small businessmen: a contractor, merchant, realtor, farm 
implement's agent, two lawyers, and a foreman with shares in the Amherst 
Foundry Co., who were suffering from the decline in business precipitated by 
the general strike. In fact, the councillors and other small businessmen 
expressed some cautious support for the strikers, especially those employed by 
the carworks. Many felt that, as the Daily News editorialized, the "unpleasant-
ness in the town was due almost altogether to the uncertainty that has prevailed 
at the Car Works".71 Lawyer and former Liberal M.P. Hance Logan chided 
Canadian Car & Foundry "with its head office and Directorate in Montreal" 
because it was "naturally more interested" in its central Canadian operations 
"than [in] our own local industry".72 Thus, at the end of May when the Amherst 
Federation of Labor approached the council to arbitrate the strike, the council 
-immediately appointed a committee to try and resolve the dispute.73 After 
several days of separate meetings with the union and employers, the committee 
announced that the employers were prepared to bargain with committees of 
their employees, including a member of the Amherst Federation of Labor 
executive. Furthermore, the employers conceded that the employee committees 
with whom they would meet did not have "the power to accept or refuse any 
proposition without the sanction" of the Amherst Federation of Labor general 
executive.74 This in effect recognized the Amherst Federation of Labor because 
executive decisions required membership sanction. Elated by the decision, the 
union committees met with the employers, expecting a quick end to the strike, 
but the manufacturers retracted their offer without explanation. 
The employers probably hoped that the desperate economic circumstances 
facing many of the strikers would force them to return to work. Apparently the 
union officials shared a similar concern, for they launched a major fund raising 
drive. A relief committee solicited funds from the Robb employees and local 
merchants, and sent delegations to labour meetings in Moncton, Joggins, and 
Springhill. The best response came from the Springhill miners who collected 
$537 in a house to house canvass.75 The Amherst Federation of Labor also 
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organized a "patronize those who patronize us" campaign and advertised that 
"electrical workers" and "employees of different industries" affected by the 
strike would accept odd jobs around Amherst.76 Moral support came in the form 
of a continuous flow of labour leaders into the town. C.C. Dane and C M . 
Arsenault of Pictou County; Silby Barrett of Cape Breton; W.N. Goodwin of 
Truro, formerly of the Winnipeg T.L.C.; and a number of Cumberland 
County United Mine Workers' of America officials addressed the various 
union evening meetings.77 As the general strike continued through the first week 
of June, support for the Amherst Federation of Labor remained strong. By this 
point in the dispute, picketing was unnecessary. Early in the strike Victor 
Woodworking had attempted to re-open with non-union staff, but the Amherst 
Federation of Labor members had marched to the plant and frightened away the 
employees. After the initial excitement of the first few days of the strike, the 
daily routine of many working class families centered around putting in their 
gardens, perhaps spending the afternoon at the labour hall, and attending the 
evening union meeting.78 
On 9 June the federal government's Royal Commission on Industrial 
Relations opened hearings in Amherst, bringing together representatives from 
both sides in the general strike. Several hundred Amherst Federation of Labor 
members greeted "with hearty" laughter D.W. Robb's report to the commis-
sion, especially his assertion that rents in Amherst were low. On the other hand, 
the workers "warmly applauded any statement that appeared to favour them", 
until Justice Mather, the chairman, "threatened to adjourn the meeting if quiet 
was not maintained". Over the afternoon, Mather and his fellow commissioners 
heard Amherst's most prominent businessmen condemn the Amherst Federa-
tion of Labor for leading a strike "similar to that in Winnipeg". They also 
endorsed international unions in preference to "local organizations" and 
committed themselves to the eight hour day, if it was adopted universally across 
Canada. Labour spokesmen used the commission's hearings as another oppor-
tunity to catalogue their list of grievances against local employers. Although the 
session did not settle the strike, the opportunity to vent its frustrations with 
conditions in Amherst to an apparently neutral body boosted the union's 
morale.79 
Throughout the strike, attacks were made on the integrity of the union's 
leadership. Frank Burke felt the brunt of most of these individual attacks, 
although G.M. Arsenault, as an outside "labour agitator", faced considerable 
criticism. When the Amherst Federation of Labor's leadership was accused of 
76 Eastern Federationist, 7 June 1919. 
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transferring union funds to the local Catholic Church, Burke replied that these 
"rumours" were attempts "to split the organization through the creation of 
religious strife". When some employers pronounced that international unions 
were preferrable to "local organizations", many workers saw this as yet another 
ploy to weaken the Amherst Federation of Labor. In one particularly bitter 
report Daily News editor, A.D. Ross, one of the strongest exponents of craft 
unionism, criticized the Amherst Federation of Labor for disregarding "regular 
trade union principles" and for adopting "the Western One Big Union 
program". Concerned by the effectiveness of the general strike, Ross worried 
that "force" would be the "only medium to be applied in the settlement of future 
industrial disputes in the community".80 
The most serious attack on the union's credibility came when the Daily News 
reported on 6 June that at the previous evening's meeting, employees from 
Victor Woodworking had tried to raise the question of a return to work, but 
"failed to get a complete hearing". After witnessing these events, disgusted 
employees of another woodworking company also interested in ending the strike 
decided to "retire from the hall". Frank Burke quickly challenged the story's 
accuracy, insisting that the appeal presented by six employees of the Victor 
Woodworking Co. had been aired fully at the meeting. When their position was 
put to a general membership vote, he pointed out that almost 1,400 strikers 
voted "in favour of leaving the matter in the hands of the general executive".81 
The principle of maintaining the general strike until all workers had acceptable 
agreements with their employers had been confirmed earlier in the week, when 
the Amherst Boot & Shoe Co. had offered its employees a settlement weighted 
heavily in favour of its skilled workers. When several of these skilled workers 
had brought the offer to an Amherst Federation of Labor meeting, the 
shoeworks' largely unskilled women workers, with the support of the majority of 
the company's skilled employees, had strenuously opposed it. Not surprisingly, 
the proposed settlement had been defeated soundly and the strike at the 
shoeworks continued.82 
At the end of the strike's third week, the town council's strike committee 
managed to bring the two sides together. With the union's strike fund depleted it 
was only the strikers' determination to wring concessions from the manufac-
turers that kept them away from work. On the other hand, the employers 
recognized that their factories would not re-open until a number of union 
demands were met. Who was to make what compromises remained the crucial 
question. At the Amherst Federation of Labor's meeting on 12 June, Frank 
Burke announced that the labour situation had "changed materially" over the 
80 Daily News, 9 June, 21 May, 6 June 1919. 
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past few days. The Amherst Boot & Shoe, Amherst Foundry, Christie Bros., 
and the Victor Woodworking Co. had offered to meet with Amherst Federation 
of Labor committees from their factories and had conceded the nine hour day 
with wage increases that ensured that the workers' weekly pay remained at 
pre-strike levels. Similar agreements with the Canadian Car & Foundry and 
Rhodes-Curry Woodworking also appeared likely. Burke informed his 
audience that "after long deliberation" the Amherst Federation of Labor 
executive had decided to recommend that the union accept these offers; the 
alternative was to "continue a deadlock to the bitter end", which, given the 
finacial circumstances of many members, seemed pointless. Union members, 
wearied by the long strike, agreed and "adopted unanimously" the executive's 
position.83 Workers in the four factories with new wage scales scheduled an 
immediate return to work and the others planned to follow suit as soon as agree-
ments could be finalized with their employers. In the case of Canadian Car & 
Foundry and Rhodes-Curry, wage schedules similar to those of the other four 
factories were agreed to the following day.84 The woollen mill and a local garage 
remained on strike for several days longer until the garage mechanics called off 
their strike. The dispute at the woollen mill proved more complex, as Stanfield 
continued to ignore the strike, but the factory gradually re-opened. 
How did Amherst workers assess the results of their three week general 
strike? Some workers, like textile worker Albert St. Peter, were embittered and 
accused Burke of the misuse of union funds.85 But this was not the opinion of the 
majority of Amherst Federation of Labor members, who in July re-elected the 
union's executive for another year. They must have agreed with the Eastern 
Federationist's assessment of the May events: "We heartily congratulate the 
Amherst union workers on their victory for no matter what may be said to the 
contrary it was a victory for their recognition and [sic] raise in pay. Not bad for 
beginners".86 But while the majority of workers did win a shorter working day 
and higher wages, the victory was not all they had hoped for. Through their 
resistance to the union, the employers managed to stop the Amherst Federation 
of Labor short of the eight hour day and at the woollen mill they defeated the 
union on all counts. Coupled with the events at Robb Engineering, these 
employer initiatives weakened the union and it never recovered the momentum 
it had enjoyed in the months prior to the strike. 
The energy of the Amherst labour movement did not suddenly dissipate after 
the general strike. In the months ahead, the Amherst Federation of Labor 
continued to represent local workers and remained especially strong in the 
carworks. Although its leadership changed little over the next several years it 
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seems unlikely that they maintained any formal contact with theO.B.U. beyond 
1919. In 1920 local events continued to consume the union's attention as the 
women employees at Stanfield's led their third strike in as many years; the 
principle issue once again was working conditions.87 At the Canadian Car & 
Foundry and at Robb Engineering, metal workers struck over demands for wage 
parity with central Canadian workers and for better working conditions.88 The 
1920 provincial election also attracted the attention of the Amherst labour 
movement as they helped elect Springhill miner Archie Terris, Cumberland 
County's Independent Labor Party candidate. Yet, despite all this activity, by 
the middle of the 1920s the formal presence of a trade union movement in 
Amherst had all but disappeared. In 1923, the Amherst Federation of Labor 
dissolved and the locals of international unions among machinists, moulders, 
and boilermakers struggled to survive in a time of declining memberships. 
Although in the 1920s trade union activity declined nationally for a variety of 
political and economic reasons, it was above all the depressed state of Amherst's 
economy which explains the downturn in the fortunes of the local labour 
movement.89 The worst fears voiced for Amherst's future in 1919 had become a 
reality as the carworks, woollen mill, shoe factory and several smaller 
companies closed permanently, and Robb Engineering, now a division of 
Dominion Bridge Co., employed fewer than 100 workers. The collapse of the 
town's industries left almost 3,000 residents unemployed and many of them 
began the trek "down the road" to Canada's other regions and the New 
England states. Between 1921 and 1931, Amherst's population declined from 
10,000 to 7,500.90 
The Amherst general strike was the response of the local working-class to the 
post World War One crisis of industrial capitalism at home and abroad. In 
Amherst, as elsewhere in the Maritimes, intensifying regional disparities gave 
the situation a special urgency. In shaping their reaction to this crisis, local 
labour leaders drew on their pre-war trade union and political experiences, 
which when combined with the ideas of industrial unionism and socialism, were 
institutionalized in the Amherst Federation of Labor. Seeking protection in the 
workplace and wage parity with other Canadians, Amherst's skilled and 
non-skilled workers alike created the town's largest, most militant and, at least 
temporarily, most successful labour organization. On the other hand, it was 
these same regional economic and social forces that eventually destroyed the 
Amherst Federation of Labor and that have severely weakened the local labour 
movement through to this day. 
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